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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

Plaintiff Secured Investment Corp. ("SIC") brought a breach of contract claim against the
Defendant, Myers Executive Building, LLC, ("Myers") which sought enforcement of an
arbitration term of the parties' contract, or a money judgment. SIC attempted service on the
registered agent of Myers (an administratively dissolved company) in Washington on a number
of occasions, but suspected that Myers' agent was aware of the lawsuit and actively avoiding
service. SIC therefore brought a motion to get permission to accomplish service by publication.
The trial court ordered service by publication, and SIC complied with the requirements of the
Court through publication and mailing. In an effort to "over-notice" (and not as a substitute for
publication and mailing of the Summons and Complaint) SIC also emailed the Myers' agent the
Summons and Complaint at two of her known email addresses. Service through publication was
completed, and no answer was filed within the required time, and default was entered. Myers
thereafter filed a general appearance through its counsel, and weeks later brought a motion to set
aside the default judgment.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that Myers failed to demonstrate mistake,
inadvertent surprise or excusable neglect under I.R.C.P. 60(b). The trial court also found that
any defense based on personal jurisdiction was waived under LR. C.P. 12(b)( 6) when Myers filed
a general appearance and responsive motion. The trial court also found that Myers' action in
failing to file an answer and having its California attorney make a single phone call related to
arbitration was not the result of a mistake, inadvertent surprise, or excusable neglect. The trial
court found that a prudent person who had actual knowledge of the lawsuit would have done
more than rely on their California attorney to call about possibly arbitrating a matter that was
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pending in an Idaho court. The trial court found that a reasonable person would have to do
something else, something more, than simply make one phone call. Finally, the trial court found
that Myers' delay of waiting a number of weeks before filing its motion to set aside was not
reasonable under the circumstances.

B.

Course of Proceedings

Myers' recitation of the course of proceeding is mostly accurate. However, the Record
does not supports Myers' claim that the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Default was set at
"the earliest possible date that the District Court had available". See R., Pp. 53-54.

C.

Statement of Facts
1.

The Parties' Agreement and Myers' Breach

On September 7, 2011, Secured Investment Corp. ("SIC") entered into a Lender/
Investor Agreement with Defendant Myers Executive Building, LLC ("Myers") ("Agreement"),
which provided that Myers would agree to indemnify and hold SIC harmless
from and against all claims, no matter whether styled in contract or tort, damages,
actions or other source of Liability no matter how denominated arising out of or
connected in any manner to any transaction entered into by [Myers]. In the event
that [SIC] is named in any such action, [Myers] agrees to assume [SIC's] defense
and pay all legal costs and expenses associated with the action. [Myers] shall
retain the right to retain counsel of its own choice in connection with any such
defense and [Myers] shall be liable for the costs of any such retained counsel.
R., Pp. 7, 15 (A Verification of Complaint was filed on January 7, 2015. R., Pp. 18-19).
The Agreement contemplated that SIC would locate borrowers interested in investing in
real estate, and connect them with lenders/investors who would make a decision as to whether
they would loan them money for their proposed investment. Any and all risk associated with the
loans and investments was placed squarely on Myers. The Agreement further provided "[Myers]
understands that [SIC] may submit template documents for the proposed transaction, but it is
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[Myers's] responsibility to have any such documents reviewed for accuracy, completeness and
legal compliance." The Agreement further stated that SIC was not a licensed mortgage
originator or broker in any state, that Myers was obligated to conduct an independent review of
any proposed transaction for compliance with local law, and that Myers assumed the risks
associated with the transaction. R., Pp. 15, 19.
Both Myers and SIC were sued by a borrower in Minnesota as a result of the September
7, 2011 transaction. Myers initially denied that it would be required to pay defense costs, but
later agreed to split the cost oflitigation and to jointly hire Minnesota attorney Christopher
Grote. R., P. 8 (ifl 0-11 ). Mr. Grote confirmed this agreement between SIC and Myers by way
of an April 11, 2013 letter that was mailed to both SIC and Myers. R., P. 8 (if 11). Myers was
originally obligated to indemnify and hold SIC harmless from any and all claims arising out of or
connected in any manner to the transaction. However, Myers disputed its obligation to
indemnify and hold SIC harmless for the litigation, and reached an agreement of accord with SIC
to resolve the dispute. Id. This agreement was confirmed in writing by the parties' Minnesota
attorney, Christopher Grote, in his April 11, 2013 letter ("Accord Agreement"). Id. SIC paid all
legal fees incurred in the defense of that litigation, but Myers failed to reimburse SIC for those
fees it had agreed to pay. R., Pp. 8-9.
Myers breached its agreement with SIC when it failed to pay its share oflegal expenses
as required by the parties' Accord Agreement, and also when it failed to submit the dispute to
arbitration upon demand. R., Pp. 2-3. SIC made multiple requests to submit the matter to
arbitration, but Myers either ignored the requests completely, or rejected them outright. R., Pp.
174-175, 178-187.
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2.

Idaho Law, Forum, and Jurisdiction

The Agreement disclosed that SIC was located in Coeur d'Alene Idaho at the bottom of
each page, and further provided that Myers was to make payments to SIC in Idaho. R., Pp. 1317, 19. The Agreement further provided at Paragraph 17 as follows:

Choice of Law and Forum. This Contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Idaho without reference to its choice oflaw provisions.
R., Pp. 16, 19.

In addition to the above-listed facts, Myers voluntarily filed a general Notice of
Appearance with the trial court on April 6, 2015. R., Pp. 51-52. Said Notice of Appearance did
not include a motion under Rule 12(b) (2), (4), or (5). Id. No jurisdictional arguments or
motions were made until April 22, 2015 when Myers filed its Motion to Set Aside Default

Judgment and its Memorandum in Support ofMotion to Set Aside Default Judgment. R., Pp. 4950, 55-67.

3.

Attempts to Accomplish Personal Service on Myers
Leading to SIC's Decision to Senre by Publication

SIC and its legal counsel undertook considerable research to determine where SIC's
agent for service of process in Washington could be served. This included Mr. Schmidt's legal
assistant, Terri Boyd-Davis, searching the Washington Secretary of State's website for Myers'
registered agent. The website showed that Myers was "inactive" but listed its registered agent as
Linda Youngberg ("Youngberg") with an address of 105B W Main # 118, Puyallup, WA, 983 71
("Registered Address"). R., Pp. 143-148, 175-176, 188.
On December 5, 2014, Terri Boyd-Davis contacted AA Process Servers ("AA") located
in Puyallup, Washington by email and was advised by "Yvonne" that AA could serve the
documents immediately. Ms. Boyd-Davis requested that AA serve Youngberg at the Registered
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Address. On December 10, 2014, Yvonne sent Ms. Boyd-Davis an email and called her to
inform Ms. Boyd-Davis that she could not locate Suite 118. She said there was no suite marked
as #118 but one that appeared to be #118 was vacant and for lease. R., Pp. 143-147.
Ms. Boyd-Davis conducted further research by performing Google searches and found
another address listed in Bonney Lake, Washington. After conferring with Mr. Schmidt, they
determined it would be appropriate to attempt service at this address as well. On December 11,
2014, AA was instructed to attempt service at this address. R., Pp. 144, 137.
On December 12, 2014, the AA process server left a voicernail message for Ms. BoydDavis indicating the following:
She reports that unsuccessful attempts were made at this address but they finally "got"
someone on Thursday evening. She said it was a white male in his 20s/30s who was
corning out of the driveway in a Jeep. There was also a big dark truck parked there. He
claims he doesn't know Linda Youngberg and that she doesn't live there. The server was
uncertain whether he was telling the truth or not.
R., Pp. 137, 144-145.
No other potential addresses for Myers or Youngberg could be uncovered through
research, and SIC also had no known addresses for them. Therefore, no further attempts at
service were made. R., P. 145.
SIC's attorney, William Halls, who represents SIC in litigation in California with Myers,
had dealt with Myers prior to that litigation. R., Pp. 149-150 (i! 3-4). As part of the California
litigation, and before Myers was represented by counsel, Mr. Halls spoke with Linda Youngberg
by telephone. Id.

(,r 4).

During that conversation, which occurred shortly after SIC had filed the

lawsuit, Ms. Youngberg stated that she was aware ofSIC's attempts to serve her, and that she
was going to avoid service. Id. Mr. Halls asked her how that would be helpful, and she
responded that she just liked to "make things difficult." Id.
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Later, when Mr. Halls heard from Mr. Schmidt that the process server in this action was
having problems in locating Ms. Youngberg for service, Mr. Halls realized that she was engaged
in similar tactics to those she had displayed in connection with the California litigation. Id.

(,r 5).

Based upon Mr. Halls' experience in dealing with Myers' California attorney, William Bernard,
Mr. Halls advised Mr. Schmidt that attempting to work anything out with Mr. Bernard would be
problematic. Id.

(i-f 6). Generally speaking, such attempts on Mr. Halls' part were unsuccessful

and were met with some sort of demand for an unwarranted concession. For instance, on one
occasion Mr. Halls experienced a computer virus that delayed preparation of discovery
responses. Id. When he asked for a short extension, Mr. Bernard responded that such an
extension was acceptable but only if SIC waived any rights to object to the discovery. Id. On
another occasion, when SIC's California attorney was injured in an accident and was unavailable
to attend Lee Arnold's deposition, Mr. Bernard continued with the deposition despite opposing
counsel's inability to attend. Id.

(i! 7).

After Mr. Schmidt corresponded with his client's agents and attorneys regarding Myers'
prior conduct, they all determined that it was unlikely further efforts at service would be
justified. The collective determination was that it would be most efficient to serve by publication
in order to force Myers to file an Answer. R., Pp. 137 (i-f 5), 176 (i-f 11).

4.

Application to Serve by Publication, and Evidence Presented
to Trial Court

SIC thereafter applied for permission to obtain service by publication, and obtained
permission from the trial court. R., Pp. 20-35. Facts set forth in the application included (1) that
Myers was a Washington LLC; 1 (2) that Myers had listed the address of its registered agent in

1 R., P. 7 (~ 3) (statement in Complaint); R., Pp. 18-19 (Verification of Complaint); R., P. 26 (~ 3); R., Pp. 28 (~ 24), 31 (Washington Secretary of State printout showing address, agent for service of process as "Linda Youngberg"
and "Inactive" status for Myers.)
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the state ofWashington;2 (3) that service was attempted at the address listed with the
Washington Secretary of State's website but was not successful;3 (4) that service was attempted
at another address utilized by the registered agent on more than one occasion but was not
successful;4 and (5) that upon further research, SIC's counsel categorically testified that "we are
not aware of any other potential addresses where service could be effectuated" and that "serving
the Defendant could not be completed despite due diligence." 5

5.

SIC's Service by Publication

The trial court entered its Order permitting service by publication on January 8, 2015. R.,
Pp. 34-35. On January 12, 2015, copies of the Summons and Complaint were sent via regular
mail and certified mail return receipt requested to Myers at its last known address, and to Myers'
registered agent, Linda Youngberg, at her last known address. R., P. 40.
The Alias Summons was published in the Puyallup Herald four times, with the first
publication occurring on Wednesday, January 14, 2015, and each Wednesday thereafter up until
the fourth and final publication which occurred on Wednesday, February 4, 2015. R., P. 38.
Service by publication was therefore completed on February 4, 2014. Id.

6.

SIC's Extra Email Notice to Myers, and Myers' Response

SIC also provided extra notice to Myers by emailing the Summons and Complaint to two
of Youngberg's known email addresses. The emails used for providing extra notice were

lindayoungberg@hotmail.com and myersexecutivellc_@hotmail.com. R., Pp. 40, 42. Myers
has admitted that it received the Summons and Complaint by email in January of 2015. R., P.
40.

R., Pp. 24, 27 (~~ 3-4), 28-29 (~~ 2-4).
R., Pp. 24, 27 (~~ 3-4), 28-29 (~~ 2-4).
4 R., Pp. 24, 27 (~ 4), 29 (~ 5).
5 R., P. 27 (~ 4) (emphasis added).
2

3
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On the same day the email was sent, Linda Youngberg, Myers' registered agent,
forwarded the Complaint to her California legal counsel, William Bernard, who is not licensed to
practice law in the state of Idaho. R., Pp. 69

(,r 3), 78.

Thereafter, "Ms. Youngberg was

informed by Mr. Bernard that service by email was not effective." Appellant's Opening Brief, 5
(citing R., P. 78).

Mr. Bernard admits in his Declaration that "I was not licensed to practice law in the State
of Idaho" but that he "nevertheless asked if [Linda Youngberg] had ever been personally served
with the summons and complaint in the Idaho action. Ms. Youngberg, responded categorically
that neither she, nor anyone from her company, had ever been served." Id.
On January 26, 2015, Mr. Schmidt received a voicemail left by William Bernard, the
Myers' California attorney. The voice message that was left was of very poor quality, and Mr.
Schmidt assumed Mr. Bernard was calling from a cell phone that was nearly out of range
because it was crackling and randomly cutting out. Mr. Bernard did not state that he intended to
defend the action that was filed in Idaho. His tone suggested he was annoyed, and he told Mr.
Schmidt that litigation was already occurring in California. He also stated that he had some
"suggestions" for Mr. Schmidt and requested that Mr. Schmidt call him back. He attempted to
leave a phone number, but the connection cut out and his phone number could not be heard. Mr.
Schmidt assumed Mr. Bernard would contact him again by phone, or send an email or letter. At
some point in his voicemail he also indicated that he had received a copy of the Complaint from
his client. Mr. Bernard did not indicate that he or his client intended to defend the action in the
call that was received. R 138-139.
There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Bernard contacted Mr. Schmidt and advised
that he "intended to defend the Complaint" as Myers asserts. Myers cites to R., Pp. 69-70 in
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support of its claim that Mr. Bernard stated a clear intent to defend. Appellant's Opening Brief,
P. 5. However, on this subject Mr. Bernard's affidavit only provides that
The purpose of this phone call was to advise Mr. Schmidt that I was the attorney
for MYERS in the State of California and that perhaps an open extension of time
could be granted to respond to the outstanding complaint, or alternatively, to
dismiss the complaint entirely, so that arbitration could proceed as it concerned
the allegations contained within the Idaho Complaint.
R., P. 64 (if4) (emphasis added).
Myers' does not testify that he in fact related the information he intended to. However,
even if we assume that the information he intended to relate was in fact communicated (a fact
that is disputed), Mr. Bernard's statement admits he was aware oflegal service because he
testified he asked for an "extension." Id. One does not need an extension granted unless one has
been served.
Mr. Schmidt did not receive a phone call on January 27, 2015, as contended by Mr.
Bernard. Mr. Schmidt testified in his Declaration that he contacted his client immediately after
he reviewed the phone message to describe it to his client. Mr. Schmidt's email was sent to his
client on January 26, 2015 at 2:31 pm. Mr. Schmidt did not receive two phone calls or messages
from Mr. Bernard, so he is confident that he did not receive another call on January 27 as alleged
by Mr. Bernard. R., P. 138 (ifif 7-8).
Contrary to the Myers' speculation, SIC's agents and legal counsel worked very hard to
find good addresses in order to accomplish personal service on Ms. Youngberg. After serving
the man they believed to be Ms. Youngberg' s son at one of the addresses, and after hearing about
his denial that Ms. Youngberg lived there, and also after hearing about Ms. Youngberg' s and Mr.
Bernard's conduct in other litigation, Mr. Schmidt and his client reasonably believed that they
were dealing with a party that was aware of the lawsuit and avoiding service - something Ms.
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Youngberg had done before just "to be difficult." They therefore elected to serve by publication.
Service by publication against such individuals usually elicits a response from defendants who
have been successful in evading service. It also avoids incurring unnecessary costs in fruitless
efforts to find and serve a defendant who is aware litigation has begun and needs only to be
served. It further prevents a last-minute dash to get service by publication before the six-month
deadline for service runs. R., Pp. 139 (,I 9), 176 (,Ill), 150 (fl 4-6).
Mr. Schmidt was never advised that Ms. Youngberg would be attending any depositions
in California on March 9, 2015, and there is no evidence in the record supporting such an
inference. However, even if Mr. Schmidt been informed of this, it would not have been
important to him since service by publication had already been completed as of February 4,
2015. Also, Mr. Schmidt knew that Ms. Youngberg and her attorney knew of the pendency of
the litigation, knew they had received his office's emails forwarding the Complaint and
Summons, and knew that Mr. Bernard was aware of this because that is what he stated had
prompted his call and message in the first place. R., P. 139 (,I 10).

7.

The Amount Claimed in the Complaint

As a part of SIC's Complaint in this matter, it sought $74,487.07, together with interest,
as well as up to $15,000 in attorney fees if judgment was taken by default. R., Pp. 9 (,Il 7), 10 (,I
25 & ,I A), 11 (,ID).
The Judgment entered in this matter awarded SIC exactly what it requested, which was a
"sum certain claimed, which can be by computation made certain" and was calculated6 as
follows:

6

R., Pp. 40-41 (~ 6).

10
01228102.3

a. Monetary damages equal to $74,487.07 plus additional interest at LC. §
28-22-104 rate of 12% per annum, calculated as follows:
1. ($74,487.07)((1/365)(.12)) = $24.4889 in interest per day from
April 11, 2013 to March 11, 2015 (699 days).
ii. 699 days* $24.4889/day = $17,117.74 in interest.
b. Total Costs and Fees:
$ 221.00
Filing fee
$ 100.00
Service fee
Publication fee
$ 383.83
$7,800.00
Attorney fees
TOTAL
$8,504.83
c. Total Principal and Interest:
$74,487.07
Principal
$17,117.74
Interest
TOTAL
$91,604.81
d. Total Judgment Amount:
$100.109.64
R., Pp. 40-41 (16); 47 (Default Judgment for $100,109.64).
Contrary to Myers' assertion, SIC did not seek or obtain more monetary relief as part of
its application for default than it stated in its Complaint. See R., Pp. 9-11, 47. SIC's Complaint
sought entry of a monetary judgment, and in the alternative sought to compel Myers to arbitrate.
R., Pp. 9-11. Having obtained and elected for all of the relief SIC desired (the monetary award),
there was no need for arbitration. Additionally, the Judgment entered was not a partial default
judgment. R., P. 47

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

III.

Should Respondents be awarded attorney fees on appeal?

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

A trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,221 P.3d 81, 85 (2009); accord Idaho
State Police v. Real Property, 144 Idaho 60, 62 (2007). "Although the court is vested with broad
discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion is limited
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and may be granted only on a showing of unique and compelling circumstances justifying
relief." Villa Highlands, LLC v. Western Comm. Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 598,602 (2010) (emphasis
added). "A determination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to be determined
by the trial court, whose factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous." Idaho

State Police, 144 Idaho at 62. "Motions to set aside a judgment are governed by equitable
principles and will only be granted in the most unusual of circumstances." Flood v. Katz, 143
Idaho 454,457 (2006) (emphasis added); accord Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123,
127 (2nd Cir. 2009) (declining relief on the basis of unclean hands); Wright, Miller & Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2857. "The rule attempts to strike a proper balance between
the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be
done." Id.
With respect to requests for relief from entry of a default judgment, "[d]iscretionary relief
is permitted, under subsection (b)(l), for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,"
while "relief from a void judgment pursuant to LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) is nondiscretionary such that the
appellate court may exercise free review on appeal. Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644,
647, 991 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted). "In order for a judgment to
be considered "void" under Rule 60(b )(4), there generally must have been some jurisdictional
defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, because the court lacked either personal
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction." Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991
P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1998).
In the present case, Myers "is incorrect" to argue "that a failure to deliver three-day
notice renders a judgment void, rather than merely voidable." Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,
288,221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009) (emphasis added). When a judgment is voidable, "[t]he district
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court generally has discretion whether to vacate a default judgment under I.R.C.P. 55(c)." Id. In
this case, the issue is whether Myers "appeared in the action" when its California attorney left a
telephone message with SIC's attorney. Thus, the proper standard ofreview is discretionary, and
this Court should not disturb the trial court's ruling absent a showing of an abuse of the trial
court's discretion. Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho 198,200, 795 P.2d 903,905 (Ct. App. 1990)
Under Rule 60(b), "[t]he party moving to set aside a default judgment must not only meet
the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b ), but must also plead facts which, if established, would
constitute a defense to the action." Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 38, 720 P .2d 217, 221 (Ct.
App. 1986). The "facts" must be more than mere legal conclusions. Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co.,
96 Idaho 341, 344 528 P.2d 903, 906 (1974).

It was Myers' burden as the moving party to establish the above-listed criteria. The trial
court weighed the evidence presented, specifically found that Myers did not meet its burden, and
held that the judgment should not be set aside. Tr. P. 36-41. This Court should uphold the trial
court's ruling and deny Myers' appeal.

B.

The District Court did not error by refusing to set aside the Default
Judgment pursuant to IRCP 60(b) (4) because the Judgment was not "void.".

"A void judgment is a ground for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). However, 'in order for a
judgment to be void, there generally must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to
enter the judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, l 05 Idaho 302, 306 (1983)
(citing 7 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.25[2] (2d ed. 1975);" First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 98
Idaho 598, 605 at n. 4, 570 P.2d 276,283 at n. 4 (1977).
Myers sets forth three arguments as to why the judgment is void: (1) SIC failed to give
three days' notice before seeking default, (2) the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction, and

13
01228102.3

(3) Myers was not properly served. As is set forth in detail below, each of these arguments is
without merit. First, SIC was not required to give three days notice because Myers did not
appear in the action. Second, the subject of personal jurisdiction was waived when Myers filed a
voluntary general appearance and failed to simultaneously contest jurisdiction of the District
Court. Third, Myers was properly served by publication, and also received actual notice of the
pendence of the suit. Therefore, Myers has not established that he was entitled to relief from the
judgment and order of the court on the ground that the judgment was void.
1.

Myers did not "appear" in the action based on a single telephone
message, and was therefore not entitled to three-days' written notice
of SIC's intent to take a default.

Myers has cited to the case of Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho 198 (Ct. App. 1990) for the
proposition that a default entered without three-days' written notice violates due process.

Appellant's Opening Brief, Pp. 9, 10. Myers' reliance on Nickels is misplaced because the
Nickels decision favors SIC's position, not Myers'. In Nickels, the defendant against whom a
default was entered argued that because it had a separate action pending concerning the same
transaction in Utah, that its dispute of the claim there demonstrated its intent to defend in Idaho.
In rejecting this argument, the Nickels 7 Court explained:
As is apparent from the rule, a prerequisite to the three-day notice is an
appearance in the action by the party against whom judgment by default is sought.
In Idaho this appearance is not limited to a formal court appearance. The term has
been more broadly defined by Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 672 P.2d 231
(1983). In Newbold the defendant visited the plaintiffs attorney at his office and
later attended a deposition. Plaintiffs attorney at the deposition acknowledged
that defendant was representing himself. Our Supreme Court held that these facts
were sufficient to show an appearance for the purposes of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2).
Essentially, the Court has held that "conduct on the part of the defendant which
indicates an intent to defend against the action can constitute an appearance
within the meaning of the rule." Catledge v. Transport Tire Company, Inc., l 07
Idaho 602,606, 69i P.2d i2i7, i221 (1984) (citing Newbold).

7 Because

this case is so instructive and similar to the present dispute, it is quoted at length.
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Durbano asks this Court to take the "intent to defend" statement in Newbold and
Catledge a step further. He argues that by filing the action in Utah to enforce the
sale contract he clearly has indicated his intention to defend against any claim that
Nickels had as a result of the transaction. He notes that the parties were actively
litigating the case in Utah-albeit over the threshold question of jurisdiction-when
his default was taken in Idaho for failing to appear in this action.
We have found no case holding that, where each party to a disputed transaction
has filed his own action against the other, in separate courts, one party's pursuit of
his own action wiil constitute "conduct" indicating an intent to defend against the
adversary's action so that for the purpose of Rule 55(b )(2) it can be said an
"appearance" has been made in the adversary's action.
In addition to the Newbold, Catledge, and Collex cases, Durbano relies on HF.
Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689
(D.C.Cir.1970) (cited in Newbold) and Charlton L. Davis & Co. P.C. v. Fedder
Data Center, 556 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.1977). In each of these cases, however, the
defaulted party had engaged in some activity in the action in which the default
judgment was obtained.
In each of the cases we have examined, some correspondence, participation in

proceedings, or discussions acknowledging the existence of a pending legal
action which indicate an intent to defend are central to a holding that an
appearance has been made in the action. Other courts hold that "(a)n
appearance in an action involves some submission or presentation to the
court by which a party shows his intention to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court." US. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., 664
P.2d 121, 124 (Wyo.1983). Accord, Patterson v. Rockwell International, 665
S.W.2d 96 (Tenn.1984) (defendant's conduct must imply a general appearance,
not just one contesting only jurisdiction). See also R.F. v. D. G. W., 192 Colo. 528,
560 P.2d 837 (1977) (defendant's conduct must be sufficient to indicate to the trial
court an interest in defending on the merits of the action).
In the present case, Nickels' counsel concedes that before Durbano commenced
the litigation he had discussions with Durbano's counsel regarding settlement of
the underlying dispute. These discussions occurred from October 1987 until
March 1988. Durbano's Utah counsel, in an affidavit, states that the discussions
between counsel also occurred after Durbano was served with process in the
Idaho action, leading to an "understanding" that the question of jurisdiction would
be determined in the Utah court before any action would be necessary in the Idaho
case. Durbano's counsel produced no records or notations of any such calls.
Nickels' counsel adamantly denied that any such conversations or other direct
communication had occurred between the filing of the Idaho action and the entry
of the default judgment. His affidavit was specific. Durbano had the burden of
persuasion on this point. Although the district judge did not specifically address
this issue of fact, the judge did find that "the defendants were aware of the
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Idaho action and did nothing in regard to the Idaho action prior to the entry
of the default judgment." We are satisfied that the record supports this finding
and we will defer to it.

Id. at 201-203 (emphasis added).
The cases cited by Myers would never support Myers' contention that leaving a
voicemail would constitute a clear statement of intent to defend. All of the cases 8 dealing with
the issue required significant correspondence or "contacts demonstrating a clear purpose to
defend." In re Roxford Foods, Inc., 12 F.3d 875 (C.A.9 1993). Further, it is illogical that Myers
would state an intent to defend in Idaho and ask for an extension to file an answer, where at the
same time it contests both long-arm jurisdiction and asserts that Idaho does not have personal
jurisdiction based on inadequate service. This is because the clear statement of an intent to
defend must be one "by which a party shows his intention to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the court." Nickels at 203. (emphasis added).

In the present case, we have Myers' California attorney claiming that he stated an intent
to defend in a single voicemail allegedly left on January 27, 2015. However, no such voicemail

8

Other cases cited by Defendant included: Knight Ins., Inc. 109 Idaho at 59: (withdrawing
attorney's failure to give client proper notice of withdrawal per Rule l l(b)(3) justified setting
default aside; holding was not based on IRCP Rule 55(b)(2)'s three-day notice requirement);
Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho 198 (Ct. App. 1990) (court rejected argument of defaulted
defendant that parallel litigation in Utah and correspondence over dispute constituted notice of
intent to defend in Idaho action; disagreement over merits does not constitute notice of intent to
defend; cited several cases for proposition that real and meaningful involvement in the particular
case where default was obtained is required); Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho 57 (1983) (after
defendant had appeared, and plaintiff amended the complaint, defendant's failure to file an
answer to the amended complaint within ten days per Rule 15(a) still required that plaintiff give
three-days' notice prior to seeking default under Rule 55(b)(2)); Newbold v. Arvidson, 105
Idaho 663 (1983) (where a prose defendant had visited plaintiffs attorney in his office,
attended a deposition, and stated on the record during the deposition that he was representing
himself, defendant was entitled to three-days' notice.); H.F. Livermore Corp. v.
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689 (1970) (nine months of written
correspondence documenting dispute and intent of defendant to defend was sufficient to entitle
defendant to three-days' notice).
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was received on that date. R., P. 138 (,i,r 7-8). SIC has introduced evidence (based on Michael
Schmidt's own recollection and an email he sent to his clients on January 26, 2015 concerning
the message that was left) that while he did get a voicemail from Mr. Bernard,9 that voicemail
was reviewed a full day prior to Mr. Bernard's alleged voicemail. R., P. 138 (i!i! 7-8). The
voicemail that Mr. Schmidt received was over a poor connection, and sounded like Mr. Bernard
intended to lecture him on a number of non-specific "suggestions." Id. In the voicemail, there
was never any clear statement of an intent to defend. Id. At most, it sounded like Mr. Bernard
was annoyed, and wanted to relate that annoyance to Mr. Schmidt in person. Id. Based upon
recommendations from SIC, SIC's local transactional counsel, and SIC's California counsel, Mr.
Schmidt did not return Mr. Bernard's call but simply waited for an Answer to be filed by an
Idaho attorney. R., P. 150 (i! 6). Mr. Bernard did try to leave a contact number to return Mr.
Bernard's call, but like the rest of the call, it was broken up and the phone number could not be
deciphered. R., P. 138

(i! 7).

Myers did not state a clear intent to defend in its counsel's single voicemail to Mr.
Schmidt, but even ifhe had, that minimal effort is not sufficient for purposes of entitling Myers
to a three-day notice. It is not difficult to imagine the problems that would arise if this Court
were to hold that a single telephone message of disputed content could serve as an "appearance"
for purposes of Rule 55(b )(2). From a public policy perspective, if a defendant wants three days'
notice before having a default entered, the defendant needs to clearly and unequivocally submit
to the jurisdiction of the court, or at a minimum, state its intent to defend in writing or on the
record.

Myers asserts on page 11 of Appellant's Opening Briefthat "The telephone call from Mr.
Bernard to Mr. Schmidt is not in dispute." Id. That statement is not accurate. While it is true
the existence of the call is not in dispute, the date of the call and the contents of the message are
clearly disputed. R., P. 138 (if7-8).
9
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Myers argues on the one hand that it "appeared" in the action thus entitling it to the threeday noticing requirement of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), but on the other hand has denied that Idaho has
personal jurisdiction over it. Myers' positions are entirely inconsistent with a true "appearance."
Likewise, Mr. Bernard stated as part of his Declaration that he was seeking "an open extension
ohime ... to respond to the outstanding complaint." R., P. 69. Myers is again inconsistent with
its arguments, as Myers would not need an "extension" of time if it contested jurisdiction or
service of process.
Myers has not established that it was entitled to relief from the judgment and order of the
court on the ground that the judgment was void. Accordingly, SIC requests that Myers' appeal
be denied.

2.

The Default Judgment is not Void because the District Court has
Personal Jurisdiction over Myers.

"If a party wishes to insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must keep out for
all purposes except to make that objection." Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319,320, 193
P.3d 866, 867 (2008) (quoting Pingree Cattle Loan Co. v. Charles J. Webb & Co., 36 Idaho 442,
446 (1922)). "The filing of a notice of appearance by a party is equivalent to the service of
process upon that party." Engleman v. Milanez, 137 Idaho 83, 84 (2002).
In Engleman, the defendant's attorney filed a notice of appearance, and stated that he
"hereby reserves all objections and defenses" including Rule 12(b) defenses. Id. On appeal, the
Engleman Court explained, "In this case, defendants' counsel filed a notice of appearance on

May 8, 2000. That notice of appearance was not a motion under Rule 12(b) (2), (4), or (5), and
therefore the filing of the notice constituted a voluntary appearance by the defendants in this
action." Id. at 85.
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Jurisdiction over Myers has been established because Myers filed a general appearance
on April 6, 2015, and did not file a simultaneous motion under Rule 12(b) (2), (4), or (5) in
connection with the appearance. R., Pp. 51-52. When Myers filed its general appearance, it
submitted for all purposes to the jurisdiction of the trial court, and therefore any retroactive
decisions related to the default judgment would become binding upon it once made. Myers was
free to argue that service of process was defective, and that this was relevant to its mistake,
surprise or excusable neglect arguments under I.R.P.C. 60(b)(l). However, after the trial court
found that Myers did not meet its burden of persuasion on its motion to set aside, Myers cannot
retroactively retract its submission to the jurisdiction of the court and maintain that everything
remains "void" for want of personal jurisdiction.
Myers has not established that he was entitled to relief from the judgment and order of
the court on the ground that the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, SIC requests that Myers' appeal be denied.

3.

SIC accomplished service on Myers through publication, and
even provided additional notice to Myers of the pendency of
the lawsuit.

Myers has argued that SIC failed to properly serve Myers because SIC's affidavits "were
defective" and that "the affidavits did not set forth that Myers does not have a business agent,
manager or cashier that could be found within Idaho" and that "[s]uch a statement is required
under Idaho Code§ 5-508." Appellant's Opening Brief, 14. Myers argument lacks merit because
the application met at least three of the alternative grounds for permitting service by publication.
Further, Myers fails to cite any authority for the proposition that the service by publication is
rendered "ineffective" once ordered by the trial court.
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First, Idaho Code § 5-508 sets forth a number of alternative factual situations under
which service by publication is authorized, and it is not required that in all instances the affidavit
include a statement about whether a business agent, manager or cashier could be found in Idaho.
Idaho Code § 5-508 provides in relevant part:
When the person on whom the service is to be made resides outside of the state,
m: has departed from the state, Q! cannot after due diligence be found within the
state, Q! conceals himself therein to avoid the service of summons, Q! is a foreign
corporation having no managing or business agent, cashier or secretary within this
state, . . . and such facts appear by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court in
which the suit is pending... the court may make an order for the publication of
the summons; and an affidavit setting forth in ordinary and concise language any
of the grounds as above set forth, upon which the publication of the summons is
sought, shall be sufficient without setting forth or showing what efforts have
been made or what diligence has been exerted in attempting to find the
defendant.
Idaho Code§ 5-508 (emphasis added).
Facts set forth in the affidavits filed in support of SI C's application included ample
evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the person on whom the service is to be
made resides outside of the state because the only addresses they found for both Myers and Linda
Youngberg were in Washington, and she could not be located there after numerous attempts to
serve her. R., Pp. 26-27. Further, she could not "after due diligence be found within the state"
because she could not be found at all, meaning she could not be found in any location, which
would obviously include Idaho. Id. SIC also demonstrated that Myers was a foreign corporation
having no managing or business agent, cashier or secretary within this state because SIC's
counsel categorically testified that "we are not aware of any other potential addresses where
service could be effectuated" and that "serving the Defendant could not be completed despite due
diligence." R., Pp. 26-27 (emphasis added).
SIC met at least three of the alternative grounds, and is not required to specifically use
the terms "business agents, managers or cashiers" in all instances before obtaining authorization
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to serve by publication. Additionally, Myers presents no authority in support of its position that
a defect in the application for permission to accomplish service by publication would void the
order and subsequent service.
It is worth noting that Ms. Youngberg does not state in her Declaration that she was
present or living at the address that is listed for Myers with the Washington Secretary of State.
The only evidence in the record is that when SIC's process server attempted service at the
address, "she could not locate Suite 118. She said there was no suite marked as #118 but one that
appeared to be #118 was vacant and for lease." R., P. 144. See also, R., P. 24 (process server's
testimony that "There is no suite # 118 or anyone named Linda Youngberg associated with that
address").
Ms. Youngberg also never claims that she was unaware that Myers was being served by
publication. R., Pp. 75-79. The same is true with respect to Mr. Bernard- there is no testimony
that he was unaware that service by publication was being pursued. R., Pp. 69-71. The evidence
presented to the trial court strongly suggests that they want the Court to believe this, but there is
no evidence this was the case. During oral argument, the trial court questioned Myers' counsel
"so they can't argue that they didn't know. They can argue that service wasn't proper," to which
Myers counsel responded "Correct." Tr. P. 10, 11. 17-20. Yet Myers' counsel went on to assert
"Nobody knew that publication had been made. I mean, if a publication had been made and
somebody knew about it, they would have probably filed an answer." Tr., P. 11, LL 6-9. Neither
Mr. Bernard nor Ms. Youngberg testified that they did not know service of process by
publication was occurring.
The Summons and Complaint were provided by certified and regular mail to the last
known addresses of Myers' agent, as well as by email. R., P. 40. SIC went the extra mile in
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sending these documents by email to two known addresses of Linda Youngberg's. Id. The
emails were not an attempt to "serve" Myers by email as it tries characterize it. Instead, service
by email was an attempt to "over-notice" and give Myers every opportunity to defend and file an
answer. This was done out of recognition that service by publication is not perfect, but under the
circumstances (avoiding service, not appointing a registered agent living in Washington or Idaho
to accept service, denying demands to arbitrate, demonstrating uncooperativeness in California
litigation, avoiding service in the California lawsuit, etc.), the notice by publication, regular mail,
certified mail, and email, was more than adequate to apprise Myers of the pendency of the
lawsuit, and to give Myers an opportunity to defend.
"[D]ue process requirements are satisfied if the notice given is 'reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections."' Evans v. Galloway, 108 Idaho 711, 712,
(1985) (quoting, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950).
Under the circumstances of this case, the publication, certified mail, regular mail, and email that
was received was not only reasonably calculated to apprise Myers of the pendency of the action
and afford it an opportunity to respond, it in fact acknowledged receipt of the email, the
pendency of the action, and allegedly requested an "extension" to file a response. R., P. 69

(i! 4).

Myers has not established that it was entitled to relief from the judgment and order of the
court on the ground that the judgment was void due to improper service. Accordingly, SIC
requests that Myers' appeal be denied.
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C.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion by not setting aside the
Default Judgment due to mistake, surprise or excusable neglect under IRCP
60(b)(l).

"Rule 60(b)(1) states that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The decision whether to grant relief under
the rule is committed to the discretion of the trial court." Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v.

Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913, 915 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing, Schraufaagel v.
Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 754 (Ct. App. 1987). In Shelton v. Diamond Int'! Corp., 108 Idaho
935,938, (1985), the Shelton Court adopted the current standard for review of motions to set
aside default judgments as follows:
When we review, on appeal, the trial court's application oflaw to the facts found, we will
consider whether appropriate criteria were applied and whether the result is one that
logically follows. Thus, if (a) the trial court makes findings of fact which are not clearly
erroneous, (b) the court applies to those facts the proper criteria under Rule 60(b )( 1)
(tempered by the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases), and (c) the trial court's decision
follows logically from application of such criteria to the facts found, then the court will
be deemed to have acted within its sound discretion. Its decision will not be overturned
on appeal.

Id. (quoting, Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321,325 (Ct.App.1983).
In the LR.P.C. Rule 60(b)(l) context, the term "Surprise" "is generally defined to
be 'some condition or situation in which a party to an action is unexpectedly placed to his
injury, without any default or negligence of his own, and which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against." Nickels at 908. Interestingly, Plaintiff has not argued that
there was any "mistake" or inadvertence, but instead focuses exclusively on the
excusable neglect element of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1 ). "In determining whether a party's
conduct constitutes excusable neglect, the courts must consider each case in light of its
unique facts." Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Avondale, 104
Idaho at 326). The relevant question before this Court is whether Myers' conduct in
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allowing the default to be entered constitutes excusable neglect. Olson v. Kirkham, 111
Idaho 34, 38 (Ct. App. 1986). "Under Rule 60(b) excusable neglect is conduct that might
be expected of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances." Olson at 38.
Myers' California counsel in his affidavit in support of the motion to set aside the default,
asserts that on January 12, 2015, he "received communication from my client advising that a
lawsuit against it had been filed in the state ofldaho." R., P. 69 (,I 3). This was the same day
that Myers counsel mailed and emailed Ms. Youngberg a copy of the Summons and Complaint
to her two known email addresses (linda_youngberg@hotmail.com and
myersexecutivellc_@hotmail.com). R., P. 138

(,r 7).

Myers' counsel advised her he could not

represent her. Id. He then asked if she had received anything by mail, which she indicated she
had not. Id. Because everything had been sent out that same day, any physical mailings would
have been en route to Myers' two known addresses, and could not possibly have been received.
Prior to entry of default, Myers' California counsel told Ms. Youngberg that he would
"contact SIC's Idaho counsel and could handle the arbitration." R., P. 78 (,I 13). He did not state
that he would appear, file an answer, or otherwise represent Myers, and Myers has not indicated
that she relied on him to handle the pending litigation. And in fact, even if she had relied, her
reliance would not have been reasonable given the fact that Myers' California counsel
affirmatively told her that he could not represent Myers in Idaho. R., P. 78 (,I 12). There is also
nothing in the record to indicate that Myers' counsel stated he would seek to locate or hire Idaho
counsel, and Myers does not claim it was relying on him to do so. The record demonstrates that
Myers knew it was unrepresented in Idaho, and elected not to hire Idaho counsel to advise her
with respect to what needed to occur in order to protect her interests in Idaho. Thereafter,
Myers' California counsel testified that he called SIC's counsel for the purpose of seeking an
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extension of time to respond to the outstanding complaint, or alternatively, to dismiss the
complaint entirely so that arbitration could proceed. R., P. 69

(i! 4).

There is no indication that

Myers or SIC's California Counsel did anything further after that. There is no testimony
concerning what they knew or did not know at any given time. They do not testify that they were
unaware of the pending service by publication, and they do not testify that they were unaware
that Plaintiffs were seeking a default judgment. There is no testimony of any "mistake" or a
"situation in which a party to an action is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default
or negligence of his own, and which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." A
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances would have hired Idaho counsel to
monitor the lawsuit and respond to the Complaint. Because it is Myers' burden to demonstrate
excusable neglect, Myers' failure to allege these facts is fatal to its argument.
In Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 38 (Ct. App. 1986), a defaulted defendant argued that
its neglect was excusable because it had relied on its attorney to contact the plaintiff "in regard to
previous settlement offers and to ascertain whether or not plaintiff intended to commence
probate proceedings" which the defendant's counsel believed to be a legal requirement. Id. The

Olson Court held that this was not enough to constitute excusable neglect, because "the assertion
that Olson must first go through probate proceedings does not set forth an excuse or justification
for allowing a default judgment." Id. The Olson Court held that this conduct on the part of the
defendant and its counsel was inadequate to show excusable neglect. Such conduct, addressed
solely to an argument as to a belief that the complaint was premature or improper demonstrated
conduct that "was not that which might be expected of a reasonably prudent person under the
same circumstances." Id.
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In the present case, like Olson, we have Myers' California counsel stating that he would
not represent Myers in Idaho, but he would call about handling arbitration because he thought
that was the proper way to handle the dispute. Such an argument has expressly been rejected in
Idaho. Reasonable conduct would be to hire an Idaho attorney to address the filed complaint
Additionally, this State maintains listings of docket entry in its online Idaho Repository,
which indicated that at the time the Complaint and Summons were mailed and emailed to Myers
that service by publication had begun. The Repository also eventually provided notice that the
publication had been completed, and later that a default was being sought. Given that Myers
knew of the pendency of the action, and its California Counsel had on January 27, 2015
"obtain[ed] and review[ed] a copy of the Idaho Complaint online," it had all the notice it needed
to monitor the matter. R. 69 (14). Myers has not alleged that it was relying on its California
counsel to monitor the matter or file an Answer, or that it mistakenly believed he would monitor
it, hire counsel, or respond to the Complaint. Myers' failure to monitor the matter and prevent
default from being entered cannot be said to be excusable neglect under the circumstances of this
case.
In Danz v. Lockhart, 132 Idaho 113 (Ct. App. 1998), the court considered similar
arguments. In rejecting the defendant's request to set a default judgment aside, the Danz Court
explained:
Lockhart asserted excusable neglect under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) as the justification for
relief from the default judgment. The question as to whether Lockhart's conduct in
allowing the default to be entered constituted excusable neglect, is a factual issue.
It is to be answered by considering "whether the litigant engaged in conduct
which, although constituting neglect, was nevertheless excusable because a
reasonably prudent person might have done the same thing under the
circumstances."
Lockhart argues that his failure to respond to Danz's complaint is excusable
because he did not see the notice published in the newspaper and had no actual

26
01228102.3

notice of the lawsuit. The trial court found, however, that it was reasonable to
infer from the evidence that Lockhart was aware of the proceedings and had
willfully avoided service.
The evidence submitted in support of and in opposition to Lockhart's motion
reasonably permits the inference, drawn by the district court, that Lockhart was
aware of the litigation and consciously frustrated Danz's efforts at service.

Id. at 115-116 (some internal citations omitted). The Court then likened the case to the case of
Rodell v. Nelson, 113 Idaho, 945 (Ct. App. 1988), wherein the defendant received a certified
mailing but it went unclaimed, and where the process server was attacked by dogs. The Danz
Court found similarities in the conduct, and explained:
"It is a well-settled general principle that a person has no right to shut his eyes or
ears to information and then to say that he lacked notice of the avoided facts. As a
corollary to that principle, a person may not avoid the effect of a written notice by
refusing service of the notice." 10

The district court's finding that Lockhart was aware of the pending lawsuit is not
clearly erroneous, but even if Lockhart lacked actual knowledge of the
proceeding, the evidence indicates that his ignorance was the product of his own
willful avoidance of notice. The district court was justified in finding that
Lockhart's conduct was not that of a reasonably prudent person in like
circumstances and that Lockhart's failure to respond to Danz's complaint therefore
did not fall within the bounds of excusable neglect. It follows that the district
court's denial of Lockhart's motion for relief from the judgment was not an abuse
of discretion.

Id. at 116.
The present case is similar to Danz and Rodell. Here there is no indication that the
service by publication was improper, that publication did not occur, that copies of the Summons
and Complaint were not properly mailed, or that the email containing the Summons and
Complaint was not sent. And in fact, Myers acknowledges receipt of both by email. Further,
Myers had previously refused demands for arbitration under the Agreement, has engaged in a

10

Quoting Rodell v. Nelson, at 947.
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pattern of delay and avoided service just "to be difficult," and facts presented indicated that she
was doing the same in the present lawsuit.
After receiving the lawsuit, she contacted her California attorney, who advised her that
"he could not represent Myers in Idaho because he was not licensed in Idaho." R., P. 78 ( 1 13).
Yet her California counsel advised her that "emailing the Complaint is not a recognized method
of service under Idaho law." R., P. 78

(-if 13).

Myers' actions in this case were unreasonable, and their neglect cannot be said to have
been "excusable." The evidence before this Court indicates that Myers and its California counsel
made a calculated decision to ignore the lawsuit, not research its status, and to delay and engage
in obstructive conduct just as they did when they were demanded to participate in arbitration and
they refused the demand, and just as they did when Defendant avoided service in California to
"make things difficult."
Finally, we have no explanation as to why an answer was not filed. Myers does not argue
that it was relying on its counsel to file an Answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint.
Myers also does not argue or present any evidence that it was unaware that service by
publication was being undertaken by SIC. The evidence before the trial court was that Myers'
agent was avoiding process, was aware of the Complaint, and had contacted an attorney who
stated he could not and would not represent Myers in the Idaho litigation. The same attorney
also allegedly requested "an extension" to respond to the Complaint. Nowhere in the record is
there a statement that "Myers did not file an Answer because ... " Without that explanation,
Myers cannot meet its burden of establishing that its conduct and neglect was excusable.
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Myers has not established that it was entitled to relief from the judgment and order of the
court on the ground of excusable neglect or mistake. Accordingly, SIC requests that Myers'
appeal be denied.

D.

The District Court's finding that Myers waited an unreasonable time before
moving to set the default judgment aside is not clearly erroneous, and as
such, its decision to deny Myers' motion to set aside should be upheld.

In connection with a motion to set aside a default judgment, a party must demonstrate
that it was diligent in seeking to set aside a default judgment in order to establish its conduct was
reasonable and prudent. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,291 (2009). "A party challenging a
default judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b )(5) must do so 'within a reasonable time."' Id. "Whether
a motion under Rule 60(b) is timely is an issue of fact for the district court. The district court's
determination is subject to clear-error review." Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,291, (2009).
On appeal, the Court must "defer to the trial court's findings on that issue unless they are clearly
erroneous. Viafax v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 72 (Ct. App. 2000); Shelton v. Diamond
Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 937 (1985). The Court must also "examine[] the length of time

between the moment the judgment becomes apparent to the defendant and the date the Rule
60(b) motion is filed. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,291, (2009); Via/ax v. Stuckenbrock,
134 Idaho 65, 72 (Ct. App. 2000). Further, even where a defaulted party can show that a default
judgment was acquired through surprise or excusable neglect, a district court's finding that the
movant' s delay was unreasonable constitutes a proper grounds for refusing to set a default aside.
Viafax at 71.

In the present case, the trial court not only found that Myers' conduct was unreasonable

under the circumstances and did not constitute mistake, inadvertent surprise or excusable neglect,
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but it also made an independent but related finding that under the circumstances, its delay in
moving to set the default judgment aside was unreasonable, stating:
The Court finds even when the defendant entered its formal notice of appearance
three weeks after the default judgment ... it still waited another sixteen days to file
its motion to set aside the default in this matter.
Tr. P. 40-41, LI. 25-5.
The trial court properly considered all of Myers' conduct that precipitated entry of
default, and also considered its conduct after default had been entered. It found the conduct
before default to be unreasonable under the circumstances, and the subsequent delay to also be
unreasonable. This finding was discretionary on the part of the district court, and its denial of
the motion to set aside the default judgment should not be set aside.

E.

Myers failed to demonstrate that it possesses a meritorious defense.

It is firmly established in Idaho that a party must demonstrate a meritorious defense
before a default judgment will be set aside. Idaho State Police v. Real Property, 144 Idaho 60, 62
(2007). In the oft-cited case defining this obligation, the Supreme Court noted:
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not only
meet the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b) but must also plead facts which, if
established, would constitute a defense to the action. It would be an idle exercise
for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real justiciable controversy.
The defense matters must be detailed.
Once a default has been entered the pleading of a defensive matter must go
beyond the mere notice requirements that would be sufficient if pied before
default. Factual details must be pied with particularity.

Hearst Corp., v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 12 (1979). "This policy recognizes that it would be an
idle exercise and a waste of judicial resources for a court to set aside a judgment if, in fact, there
is no genuine justiciable controversy." Maynard v. Nguyen, 2011 WL 3904099 (2011).
"Consequently, where no meritorious defense is shown in support of a motion to set aside a
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default, a court does not abuse its discretion in denying the motion." Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho
549,224 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2010).
"The meritorious defense requirement is a pleading requirement, not a burden of proof."

Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 63 (emphasis added). "Plead" is defined as "to assert or allege
in a pleading." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 940 (7th ed. 2000). Lest it be forgotten, Rule 7(a),
I.R.C.P., defines what constitutes a pleading in Idaho. Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319,
321 (2008). Specifically, it provides:
There shall be a complaint and an answer; and there shall be a reply to a
counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer
contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an
original party is summoned under Rule 14 and there shall be a third-party answer,
if a third-party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except
that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.

Id.
The situation at hand is akin to that presented in Idaho State Police v. Rela Property

Situated in County ofCasia, 144 Idaho 60, 63 (2007). In that case, the defendant sought to set
aside a default judgment entered in a civil forfeiture action. Id. While analyzing the defendant's
potential defense, the Court noted "[she] argues that she was an innocent owner, but she did not
submit a pleading controverting the respondent's claims or setting forth this defense." Id.
(emphasis added). The Court noted that "once default was entered ... [the Defendant] did not
present a pleading alleging facts constituting a meritorious defense." Id. As a result, the Idaho

State Police Court concluded that the trial court was correct in denying relief on the basis that the
defendant failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense due to her failure to submit a pleading
challenging the state's allegations. Id., at 64.
:Myers' position also finds support in Bach v. Afiller. 148 Idaho 549 (2010). In that case,
the defendants moved to set aside entry of default after their answer had been properly stricken.
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Id., at 1140. In support, they submitted an affidavit which contained no facts demonstrating a
meritorious defense. Id., at 1142. On appeal, the defendants attempted to argue that the
allegations set forth in their answer were sufficient. Id. Because the defendants' answer had
been stricken, the Supreme Court noted that it "could not properly be considered by the district
court in ruling on the motion." Id. Further, it pointed out that "a party may not rely on an
ordinary pleading to prove a meritorious defense." Id. Accordingly, the court held that the
defendants had failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense.
Even ifwe assume that Youngberg's declaration qualifies as the pleading of her answer,
the conclusory and non-specific assertions are not sufficient for purposes of setting aside a
default judgment. Her declaration provides only that "Myers disputed that there was any
agreement to pay any of the attorneys' fees and/or costs incurred by SIC and/or billed by L&V,
and disputes the amount claimed by SIC." This assertion would not suffice even under ordinary
pleading requirements, and fails completely to plead and set forth the "factual basis" for these
assertions "with particularity."
Myers' only recognizable defenses are (1) that the Judgment exceeds the amount sought
in the complaint (it does not), and (2) that because the Agreement allegedly led to litigation with
the borrower due to an alleged and non-specific "violation of Minnesota law," the hold harmless
provision becomes enforceable. However, as was made clear in eight separate paragraphs of the
Agreement itself, it was up to Myers to evaluate the legality of the Agreement under local law, to
have its own attorney review it, that it was Myers' "responsibility to have any such documents
reviewed for accuracy, completeness and legal compliance," and that SIC "will not conduct any
independent review or verification of the transaction and makes no representations or warranties
as to the merits of the transaction." R. 7, 14 (15). Further, Myers has not raised any defense
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with respect to the Accord Agreement to pay half of the fees incurred, which it also breached. R.,
P. 4,

(,r 15-17). As a result of Myers' failure and refusal to satisfy the Accord Agreement to pay

half of the fees, SIC sought enforcement of Myers' original duty under the original Agreement,
which required that it indemnify and hold SIC harmless from any and all claims arising out of or
connected in any manner to any transaction entered into by Myers. R., Pp. 2, 13-17.
Myers now argues, by legal conclusion only, that the Minnesota litigation is the "fault" of
SIC because the documents and transaction violated Minnesota law. Myers does not even
indicate whether the courts in that matter found that there was a violation of Minnesota law, and
if so, who bore responsibility for the violation, if anybody. Myers also fails to explain how a
violation of Minnesota law would excuse Myers from its obligation to hold SIC harmless and
indemnify it from the claims brought against both by the borrower in Minnesota. That was
clearly their agreement, it was the risk voluntarily assumed by Myers, and no defenses, legal
theories, or logic were offered in support of its defenses. What occurred was exactly what the
parties had contemplated might occur - they were sued by a borrower.
Such a conclusory argument is not an adequate "meritorious defense" to defend Myers
from its obligation to pay legal expenses as called for by the underlying Agreement. The
Agreement could not be any clearer when it comes to whom was assuming the risk and
responsibility for the legality of the transaction documents, and who would pay defense costs in
the event there was litigation. If an affirmative defense exists that makes these provisions
unenforceable, that needed to be set forth and factually pied with particularity as part of Myers'
motion. As such, there are no facts before this Court demonstrating that the Defendant possesses
a meritorious defense. While the District Court did not base its decision on Myers' failure to
plead a meritorious defense, "[w ]here an order of a lower court is correct, but based upon an

33
01228102.3

erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory. Andre v. Morrow, l 06
Idaho 455, 680 P.2d 1355 (1984). Given that a meritorious defense must established and "plead"
"with particularity," Myers' appeal must be denied.

F.

The Default Judgment was a fmal judgment under IRCP 54(a).

Myers' three-sentence argument in its opening brief is that because SIC sought either a
money judgment or to compel Myers to arbitrate their dispute, and the trial court entered a
money judgment, the judgment was not final because the arbitration request remained an open
issue. Myers' argument is without merit. After SIC obtained a money judgment there was no
need to arbitrate the dispute to find out if Myers owed SIC money. SIC elected the only
reasonable form of alternative relief it could take under the circumstances of having obtained a
default. ~ere was no need to arbitrate after receiving the award, and the judgment was final.

G.

The district court properly awarded SIC its attorneys' fees and costs.

"The award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the district court and
reviewed for an abuse of that discretion." Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v. Skinner, 157
Idaho 927,342 P.3d 639,644 (2015) (citing Smith v. Washington Cnty., 150 Idaho 388,392,247
P.3d 615,619 (2010); Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006)).
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding SIC its fees and costs as the
prevailing party in the litigation. Based upon the points and authorities set forth in this brief, SIC
remains the prevailing party, and the trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to SIC
should be upheld.
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H.

This Court should deny Myers' attorneys' fees and costs on appeal and
should award SIC its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against
the appeal.

Based upon Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and the terms of the parties' Agreement, the
prevailing party in litigation shall be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs. SIC
therefore respectfully requests an award of its fees and costs on appeal.

IV.

CONCLUSION

SIC respectfully requests that the District Court's decision to deny Myers' motion to set
aside the default judgment be upheld, and that SIC be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and
costs incurred in defending this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

If" day of January 2016.
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